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BEYOND THE REACH OF JUSTICE? 
COMPLAINANT DELAY IN HISTORIC  
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES  






The publication of the Commission to Inquire into Child 
AbuseÕs Final Report1 (the Ryan Report) in May of this year has 
forced Irish society to face up to its appalling history of child 
physical and sexual abuse in State-run institutions. Few could 
have imagined the scale and intensity of the abuse catalogued in 
the Report. The publication has generated a renewed public 
interest in the criminal justice systemÕs role in prosecuting those 
accused of the sexual abuse of children. However, ever since 
societyÕs ÒdiscoveryÓ of child sexual abuse in the mid-1990s,2  
_____________________________________________________ 
* Sinad Ring, BCL (Law and German), LLM (Criminal Justice),  
PhD Candidate, Centre for Criminal Justice and Human Rights, University 
College Cork. Irish Research Council for the Humanities and the Social 
Sciences Scholar. Email: sineadmaryring@gmail.com 
1 Commission to Inquire Into Child Abuse, Final Report (Stationery Office, 
2009). 
2 See Lalor (ed.), The End of Innocence: Child Sexual Abuse in Ireland  
(Oak Tree Press, 2001). In May 1999 the States of Fear documentary exposed 
the extent of physical and sexual abuse within State-funded religious 
institutions, giving rise to a public outcry. The Statute of Limitations 
(Amendment) Act, 2000, altered limitation periods for civil actions where 
sexual abuse suffered as a child was claimed. The Sex Offenders Act, 2001, 
established a Sex Offenders Register. In 2002 the Government indemnified the 
religious orders against 90% of the compensation claims. The Institutional 
Redress Board Act was set up under the Residential Institutions Redress Act, 
2002. The Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse was established by 
legislation in 2000, and initially chaired by Laffoy J. She resigned in 
September 2003, complaining of lack of co-operation from the Government 
and inadequate resources. The Commission, chaired by Ryan J., issued its 
Final Report in May 2009. The Renewed Programme for Government 2009 
contains a commitment to fully execute the Government Implementation Plan 
in respect of the Ryan Report: Renewed Programme for Government, 10 
October 2009, available at www.taoiseach.ie.  
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the Irish courts have been grappling with the problems posed by 
historic allegations of abuse, made by adults who claim they were 
victimised as children. In some cases the time lapse between the 
alleged abuse and the making of a complaint to the authorities can 
be as much as 40 years. Lengthy lapses of time between the 
alleged offence and reporting present huge challenges to the 
criminal process, which must vindicate the accusedÕs 
constitutional right to a fair trial, while also seeking to prosecute 
these most serious of allegations. 
The core argument of this article is that in historic 
childhood sexual abuse prosecutions, the risk of an unfair trial is 
unconstitutionally high. Support for this contention is found in 
two sets of decisions by the Superior Courts relating to historic 
child sexual abuse cases: the prohibition decisions of the High 
Court and the Supreme Court; and the decisions of the Court of 
Criminal Appeal in appeals brought by persons convicted on 
historic charges of child sexual abuse. It is argued that in light of 
the risks of an unfair trial, guidance from the appellate courts on 
directions and warnings to the jury and on rulings in evidential 
matters arising from the delay are urgently needed, in order to 
safeguard accused personsÕ due process rights. 
The article first examines the decisions of the High Court 
and the Supreme Court in prohibition applications. In these cases 
the courts consider whether the trial of the charges should be 
halted due to the lapse in time between the alleged abuse and the 
trial.3 Prohibition applications present the courts with an 
invidious dilemma: how to ensure the defendant is not put at risk 
of an unfair trial, while at the same time recognising that delay in 
reporting is a common feature in many child sexual abuse cases. 
It is argued that the accused faces an almost impossible task in 
trying to show prejudice, and that the reviewing courts rely to an 
unjustified degree on the power of the trial judge to counter the 
effects of delay by way of rulings and directions to the jury.  
That this over-reliance on the trial judgeÕs ability to 
protect due process in historic child sexual abuse cases is not 
merited is revealed in the second part of this article, which 
_____________________________________________________ 
3 This article does not deal with the separate but related issue of prosecutorial 
and systemic delay; relevant cases are listed at n. 72, below. 
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examines the decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal in 
historic child sexual abuse prosecution. While the Court is willing 
to overturn convictions on the basis of inadequate warnings, trial 
judges are left in the dark as to what constitutes an adequate 
warning on issues such as delayed reporting, relationships of 
dominion, inhibition, corroboration, and admissibility of 
evidence.  
Finally, two further matters relating to the prosecution of 
delayed complaints of childhood sexual abuse are explored: 
repressed memories, and the disclosure of the complainantÕs 
medical and psychiatric reports. These are critical issues that go 
to the heart of the fairness of historic child sexual abuse cases. 
However they have yet to be subjected to sustained analysis and 
consideration by the Irish Superior Courts.  
In concluding, it is argued that in light of the difficulties 
facing accused persons in trying to mount a defence, and in trying 
to establish prejudice, and in light of the lack of safeguards in 
terms of (a) judicial rulings on evidential and procedural matters 
arising from the delay, and (b) directions to the jury on how to 
incorporate the fact of delay into their deliberations, the risk of an 
unfair trial is unconstitutionally high, and guidance is urgently 
needed for trial judges in historic child sexual abuse cases. 
 
 
II. DELAY AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL  
Unlike summary offences, indictable offences are not 
subject to any limitation period.4 However, despite the lack of an 
express constitutional right to a speedy trial, the courts have 
interpreted Article 38.1 of the Constitution to include an 
entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition.5 Delay in the 
_____________________________________________________ 
4 This is the case even where an indictable offence is tried summarily:  
D.P.P. v. Logan [1994] 3 I.R. 254; S. v. D.P.P. (Supreme Court, unreported, 19 
December 2000). 
5 Walsh, Criminal Procedure (Round Hall, 2002), p. 17; The State (Healy) v. 
Donoghue [1976] 1 I.R. 325; In Re Singer 97 I.L.T.R. 131; D.P.P. v Byrne 
[1994] 2 I.R. 236; C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400. The fact that the 
entitlement to a trial with reasonable expedition is implicit in Article 38.1 does 
not dilute its weight: The State (OÕConnell) v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362 and 
D.P.P. v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236. However, Ò[t]he right of an accused person 
to a trial with reasonable expedition is separate from and in addition to his right 
 
                      Judicial Studies Institute Journal            [2009:2 4 
institution of proceedings can seriously prejudice the accused 
person in the preparation of his or her defence: witnesses die or 
move away; documentary and material evidence is destroyed or 
lost. Particularly in cases of lengthy delay, witnessesÕ memories 
will have faded. The accused person may be faced with having to 
mount a defence against serious charges in circumstances where 
corroborative or exculpatory evidence is simply no longer 
available, or worse, cannot be remembered.  
To compound these problems, delay may also mean that the 
prejudice to the defence cannot always be demonstrated: 
 
É the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his 
case skews the fairness of the entire system.  
If witnesses die or disappear during a delay, the 
prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defence 
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the 
distant past. Loss of memory, however, is not always 
reflected in the record because what has been forgotten 
can rarely be shown.6 
 
In cases involving delay, the accused can apply to the 
High Court by way of judicial review for an order prohibiting the 
continued prosecution of the charges. The reviewing court must 
decide whether, because of the lapse of time since the alleged 
offence, the accusedÕs trial can no longer be constitutional, and is 
in fact a Òparody of justiceÓ.7 The onus of proof lies on the 
applicant,8 and the standard to be reached is the balance of 
                                                                                                           
to a fair trialÓ: [2001] 1 I.R. 656, at 664, per Geoghegan J., Keane C.J. and 
Murphy J. concurring. The fact that it was not until 1986 that the right to an 
early trial assumed constitutional status has been described as Òsomewhat 
surprisingÓ: Hogan and Whyte, Kelly: the Irish Constitution (Lexis Nexis 
Butterworths, 4th ed., 2003), p. 1144. 
6 Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, at 532, per Powell J. 
7 This was how Henchy J. described the hearing of a civil action relating to an 
industrial accident some 23 years earlier: OÕKeeffe v. Commissioners of Public 
Works (Supreme Court, unreported, 24 March 1980). See also the judgment of 
Hardiman J. in J.OÕC. v D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478, where he describes the 
jurisprudence on delay as having its origins in civil cases. 
8 Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476. 
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probabilities.9 Applications for prohibition must be made 
promptly, and not later than three months from the conclusion of 
the investigation.10 Unlike in other common law countries,11  
the use of the abuse of process remedy in delay cases has been 
expressly rejected by the Supreme Court.12 A trial judge does not 
have jurisdiction to hear an application to stay or to quash an 
indictment on the grounds of delay.13 Delay issues require 
considerable fact-finding, and therefore the separate process of 
judicial review is more appropriate than a motion at the 
commencement of the trial.14 This is in addition to the trial 
courtÕs general and inherent power to protect its processes from 
abuse and to safeguard the accused from oppression or prejudice 




9 The People (D.P.P.) v. Byrne [1994] 2 I.R. 236; although see C. v. D.P.P. 
[2009] I.E.H.C. 121. 
10 Order 84 rule 21(1) of the Rules of the Superior Courts, 1986. However, 
time may be extended at the courtÕs discretion, if a good reason to do so is 
shown: De Riste v. Minister for Defence [2001] 1 I.R. 190. See also R. v. 
D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87, where the three month period was extended.  
See also McG. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 294 (Herbert J.).  
11 For the English approach to complainant delay see Lewis, Delayed 
Prosecutions for Child Sexual Abuse (Oxford University Press, 2006) and 
Choo, Abuse of Process in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn., 2008). For the most recent articulation of the considerations that are 
relevant to a determination of whether proceedings should be delayed as an 
abuse of process on the grounds of delay, see R. v. S. [2006] E.W.C.A. Crim. 
756; [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. 23. 
12 The People (D.P.P.) v. P.OÕC. [2006] 3 I.R. 238. 
13 The jurisdiction to quash is very limited, and must be based on some 
technical fault in the indictment: The People (D.P.P.) v. P.OÕC. [2006] I.E.S.C. 
54; [2006] 3 I.R. 238, at 245, per Denham J.  
14 P.OÕC. v D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 238, at 244-248, per Denham J.; G. v. D.P.P. 
[1994] 1 I.R. 374. 
15 The State OÕConnell v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362. 
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III. PROHIBITION APPLICATIONS IN  
HISTORIC CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
Historic child sexual abuse cases feature lapses of time so 
great that, in any other sort of case, the delay would of itself 
preclude prosecution.16 However, historic child sexual abuse 
cases have been found to involve special considerations, so that 
delayed reporting is not an automatic bar to prosecution. From the 
first prosecutions of historic childhood sexual abuse claims,  
the courts emphasised that these cases involved a unique set of 
issues and considerations that set them apart from other kinds of 
criminal prosecutions. The decisions illustrate a growing 
recognition that victims of child sexual abuse often suffer from 
feelings of fear and shame, particularly where their abuser is a 
family member or a person in authority. The abuse in some cases 
is so frequent, prolonged and intense, that by the time the matter 
reaches the courtroom, the complainants cannot remember how 
often the abused occurred.17 Often the accused person is a 
member or former member of a religious community, or is in a 
position of authority over children. Typically the accused 
person18 will have had a close relationship with the complainantsÕ 
family, and would have spent many hours in the company of the 
complainantÕs family and the complainant. The accused is often a 
family friend, a swimming coach, a volunteer in the Legion of 
Mary, a parish priest, a brother, a father. The accused person may 
_____________________________________________________ 
16 In The State (OÕConnell) v. Fawsitt [1986] I.R. 362 a delay of three years 
was described as extreme. In one of the first cases to deal with a lengthy delay 
in a sexual offences prosecution, Barr J. found that an unexplained delay of 
more than 9 years in making a complaint about alleged sexual abuse of a minor 
was unreasonably long in all the circumstances. The delay hampered the 
accused in the preparation of his defence and thus Òdeprived him of his 
constitutional right to fair procedures and a fair trialÓ. See N.C. v. D.P.P. 
[1991] 1 I.R. 471, at 476, per Barr J. Hogan and Whyte note that the case was 
before the ÒtorrentÓ of sexual abuse cases came before the courts: Hogan and 
Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (n. 5 above), p. 1155. 
17 See OÕMalley, ÒResponding to Institutional Abuse: The Law and its LimitsÓ, 
in Flannery (ed.), Responding to the Ryan Report (Columba Press, 2009),  
p. 98. 
18 The word ÒaccusedÓ is used in this article to refer to the accused person at 
trial and the applicant making the application for judicial review, in order to 
capture the criminal due process nature of the values at stake in prohibition 
applications.  
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have been investigated as part of an official investigation into 
child abuse, such as the Ferns Report.19 The accused person may 
have an Òextremely chequered pastÓ,20 may have left the Catholic 
Church in disgrace, or may have been the focus of extensive 
media attention.21  
The Courts have recognised that lengthy delay is almost 
inherent in the nature of the offence of child sexual abuse and 
victims may find it psychologically impossible to report.22 
Broader societal factors are also relevant, since Òsuch was the 
climate of disbelief which existed in the community regarding 
such allegations until recent times, the victim might well have 
been dissuaded by the risk of ridicule and scorn in coming 
forward with such a complaintÓ.23 It is in this context that the 
courts have stressed that an accused should not be allowed to 
benefit from the delay in reporting. Indeed in the cases decided 
between 1997 and 2006, the accusedÕs alleged role in causing the 
delay was relevant to the reviewing courtÕs decision as to whether 
or not to prohibit the trial. The development of the early case-law 
in historic child sexual abuse cases is considered next. 
 
A. Dominion and Balancing: B. v. D.P.P. and P.C. v. D.P.P. 
From B. v. D.P.P.24 onwards, prosecutions that were 
unstateable under the previous law came before the courts. B. was 
charged in 1993 with indecent assault and rape offences alleged 
to have been committed against three of his daughters 20 and 30 
years earlier. Delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, 
Denham J. held that, prima facie, the delay was an Òinordinate 
lapse of timeÓ.25 However, this case belonged to special category 
of cases, which involved allegations of child sexual abuse.  
The court would balance the accused personÕs rights with the 
communityÕs right to have the offences prosecuted. If the accused 
_____________________________________________________ 
19 As in D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C 48. 
20 J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48. 
21 As in J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20. 
22 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, 105, per Murray J.  
23 Hogan and Whyte, Kelly: The Irish Constitution (n. 5 above), p. 1153, 
footnote omitted. 
24 [1997] 3 I.R. 140. 
25 B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 193, per Denham J; Hamilton C.J., 
OÕFlaherty, Barrington and Keane JJ. concurring. 
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ran the real risk of an unfair trial, then on balance, the right to a 
fair trial would prevail.26 In attempting to balance the 
communityÕs right to prosecute with the rights of the accused, the 
court would inquire as to the reasons for the delay in reporting. 
Any presumed prejudice arising out of the lengthy delay in 
reporting was to be balanced not only by the absence of proven 
actual prejudice, but the court would also consider the extent to 
which the delay was due to the conduct of the accused.27 
Crucially, the CourtÕs reasoning as to the justifications for 
the delay in B was premised on an assumption that the complaint 
was true. This approach prompted McGuinness J. to sound a note 
of caution in P.C. v. D.P.P..28 The accused was a coach driver 
and a swimming teacher at a school. The time lapse between the 
alleged offences and reporting was 13 years. Having examined 
the automatic disbelief of all sexual complainants in the past, 
McGuinness J. noted that it would be Òequally unfortunate if the 
discredited orthodoxy of the past were replaced by an equally 
rigid orthodox view that in all cases of delay É the delay can 
automatically be negatived by dominionÓ.29 On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, Keane J. set out the tripartite test to be applied in 
such cases, the central pillar of which asked what were the 
reasons for the delay and, assuming the complaint to be true, 
whether they were referable to the accusedÕs conduct.30  
_____________________________________________________ 
26 [1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 196, per Denham J. See also D. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 
465 and Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476. 
27 In B. the delay was justified by the dominion exercised by the applicant over 
his daughters, and so the Supreme Court refused to prohibit the trial. The case 
never proceeded to trial, because the accused died one day after the Supreme 
CourtÕs judgment. See Doherty and OÕKeeffe, ÒJustice Denied: Delay in 
Criminal CasesÓ (1998) 49 N.I.L.Q. 385, at 401. 
28 [1999] 2 I.R. 25. 
29 Since the accused was unable to show actual prejudice, the order of 
prohibition was quashed. [1999] 2 I.R. 25, at 43, per McGuinness J. 
30 The P.C. test was: (1) Whether, depending on the nature of the charges, the 
delay was such that despite the absence of actual prejudice, the trial should be 
prohibited; (2) What were the reasons for the delay and whether, assuming the 
complaint to be true, the delay in making it was referable to the accusedÕs 
conduct; (3) Whether the accused had suffered actual prejudice such that the 
trial should not be allowed to proceed. At this stage, the presumption of 
innocence would apply. [1999] 2 I.R. 25, at 68, per Keane C.J. 
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The P.C. test centred on the assignment of fault: Could the 
victimÕs reasons for delay have been caused by the applicantÕs 
actions? Crucially, it involved an assumption as to the veracity of 
the complaint. However, not only was this assumption 
inconsistent with the presumption of innocence, it also was 
unnecessary, since it engaged the court in a fact-finding process 
that ultimately did not shed any light on whether or not the trial 
would be unfair. After all, the complainantÕs reasons for the delay 
in reporting were irrelevant to the decision as to fairness. In short, 
the P.C. test was indicative of the Supreme CourtÕs 
(understandable) desire to incorporate the complainantÕs 
experiences into the decision-making process. Unfortunately, 
however, this was at the expense of a focus on the accusedÕs fair 
trial rights. Indeed, one commentator queried whether the 
construction of fairness in sexual offences had resulted in the 
accusedÕs presumption of innocence being usurped by a 
presumption of guilt.31 Calls for a more coherent rationale for the 
courts approach to this Òsingle most contentious area of Irish 
lawÓ32 were answered in 2006, with the institution of a simplified, 
actual-prejudice-based test in the case of S.H. v. D.P.P. 
 
B. A New Test: S.H. v. D.P.P. 
In S.H. v. D.P.P.,33 the Supreme Court signalled an 
important shift in its approach to complainant delay. The accused, 
a primary school teacher, was charged in 2001 with 50 counts of 
indecent assault against minors. The assaults were alleged to have 
been committed some 40 years earlier.34 Delivering the judgment 
_____________________________________________________ 
31 Fennell, The Law of Evidence in Ireland (2nd edn., Lexis Nexis Butterworth, 
2003), p. 19. 
32 Conroy, ÒClarifying the Law on Delayed Prosecutions for Sexual OffencesÓ 
(2005) 10 Bar Review 214, at 214. See also Fennell, ÒThe Culture of Decision-
Making: A Case for Judicial Defiance Through Evidence and Fact-FindingÓ 
(2001) 1 J.S.I.J. 2; Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse 
(n. 11 above), at  p. 91; Lewis, ÒThe Presumption of Innocence in Delayed 
Criminal Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse: Lessons from IrelandÓ 
[2001] Criminal Law Review 636. 
33 [2006] I.E.S.C. 55, [2006] 3 I.R. 575, [2007] 1 I.L.R.M. 401, per Murray 
C.J., Denham, Hardiman, Geoghegan and Fennelly JJ. 
34 The appeal came on for hearing before three judges, but having heard 
submissions, the appeal was adjourned for hearing before a court of five. 
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of the Court, Murray C.J. held that judicial knowledge of issues 
relating to dominion, inhibition, disparity between the ages of the 
accused and the complainant and other issues relating to reasons 
why a complainant might delay, was now well-established. It was 
no longer necessary for the court to inquire into the reasons for 
the delay, or whether the accused had exercised dominion over 
the complainant, or to make assumptions as to the truth of the 
complaints.  
Murray C.J.Õs judgment set out the new test to be applied 
in applications for prohibition on the grounds of delay. The test is 
now solely prejudice-based: the accused must show, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the delay in reporting has resulted in 
prejudice, so as to give rise to a real and serious risk of an unfair 
trial. The court also retains a residual jurisdiction to grant an 
order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances, where it would 
be unfair or unjust to put an accused on trial. 
The removal of the fault-based test is a welcome 
development, since it was at odds with the presumption of 
innocence, and was not relevant to the decision regarding 
fairness. It also abolishes the exercise of attributing and 
apportioning blame for the delay in reporting, through expert 
evidence from psychologists on the reasons why the complainant 
delayed.35 However, an examination of the decisions in 
prohibition applications since S.H. reveals that not only are the 
courts reluctant to grant orders of prohibition,36 but that accused 
persons seeking to prohibit their trial, on charges often many 
decades old, face an extremely difficult battle, where the risk of 
an unconstitutionally unfair trial is raised to an unacceptably high 
level. This is because of the reviewing courtsÕ over-reliance on 
the trial judgeÕs ability to ensure due process and the role of the 
jury as arbiter of fact, in circumstances where there is a paucity of 
appellate guidance on how to deal with the evidential and 
procedural problems stemming from delayed reporting.  
The prohibition jurisprudence is considered in the next section. 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
35 See, for example, the discussion of the psychologistsÕ evidence in J.OÕC. v. 
D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478. 
36 They will only succeed in Òexceptional circumstancesÓ: P.D. v. D.P.P. 
[2008] I.E.S.C. 22. 
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C. The Post-S.H. Prohibition Jurisprudence 
 and the Risk of an Unfair Trial 
The threshold to be reached by the accused in a 
prohibition application is the real and serious risk of an unfair 
trial that cannot be avoided by appropriate rulings and directions 
by the trial judge.37 It is not an established certainty or a 
probability of an unfair trial.38 However, there seems to be some 
degree of confusion as to what standard is sufficient to Òget the 
[accused] over the lineÓ. Indeed, in a recent case, the burden was 
described as a ÒprobabilityÓ of a real risk of an unfair trial.39 
Nevertheless, the case law shows that the standard to be met is 
clearly very high indeed.40 The issue of presumptive prejudice 
arising from the delay will not of itself normally be enough,  
the courts preferring instead to rely on the trial courtÕs power to 
guarantee due process.41 A remote, fanciful or purely theoretical 
form of prejudice is not sufficient.42 It is now essential for 
accused persons to fully and actively engage with the facts of the 
particular case, in order to establish whether their ability to 
defend proceedings has been fatally compromised. 
Before discussing the difficulties facing accused persons 
in prohibition applications, it is essential to recall the two types of 
prejudice caused by timeÕs erosion of evidence. Both of these 
problems are direct consequences of the delay in reporting and 
both relate to issues of credibility.  
First, the disappearance or destruction of material 
evidence such as records or files, or the deterioration of 
witnessesÕ memories, can mean that the defendant is unable to 
_____________________________________________________ 
37 Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476; S.H. v. D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 575; P.OÕC. v. 
D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5,; [2008] 4 I.R. 76. 
38 Z. v. D.P.P. [1994] 2 I.R. 476, at 506, per Finlay C.J. 
39 J.C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J). 
40 McFarlane v. D.P.P. [2007] 1 I.R. 138, per Hardiman J., approved in D.D. v. 
D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 47. 
41 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5; [2008] 4 I.R. 76. On the exceptional 
nature of the prohibition remedy see D.C. v. D.P.P. [2005] I.E.S.C. 77;  
[2005] 4 I.R. 281; [2006] 1 I.L.R.M. 348; Devoy v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 13; 
[2008] 4 I.R. 235. 
42 McFarlane v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 11; [2007] 1 I.R. 134; P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. 
[2005] 4 I.R. 76. 
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test the case against him. In such a situation there exists no 
objectively verifiable Òisland of factÓ against which the credibility 
of the complainant and other witnesses may be tested.  
The second problem, which is caused by the 
disappearance of evidence, is that both the disappearance and the 
prejudice caused thereby are notoriously difficult to demonstrate. 
While the courts are more than willing to engage with the facts of 
the case, accused persons can be placed in the catch-22 situation 
of having to show how they are prejudiced by the lack of 
something that is no longer available to use. The irony is that if 
the evidence were available to use, the accused would perhaps not 
be as prejudiced by the passage of time, since time has not 
affected the evidence available. Unfortunately, in the absence of 
demonstrable prejudice, the reviewing Court will be more likely 
to presume that the defendant is not prejudiced, and will allow the 
trial to proceed.  
 
1. High Threshold of Actual Prejudice: Disappearance of an 
Island of Fact 
The principal difficulty facing defendants in delayed 
prosecutions for child sexual abuse is that evidence, witnesses 
and witnessesÕ memories may have disappeared, or degraded over 
time. If the trial had taken place within a year or two of the 
alleged abuse, the complaint would have been more detailed, and 
witnesses and evidence would most likely still be available. 
Prejudice can result where the complainant makes reference to 
specific details relating to the circumstances or timing of the 
offences, but the passage of time has resulted in the destruction of 
relevant evidence that could have been used to undermine the 
complainantÕs account. The defendant is therefore unable to 
contest a particular island of fact due to the disappearance of 
evidence or witnesses: 
 
If a person, who is innocent, is confronted with an 
allegation of this sort, he can only hope to counteract it, 
in practical terms, if he can show that the complainant 
has previously made false or improbable allegations of 
the same kind against himself or another person or if he 
can contradict the complainant on some important 
matter of fact. This, I think is the universal experience 
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of those who have prosecuted or defended such cases. 
É The position of a person, who is innocent in fact, but 
whose defence can consist only of a bare denial (just as 
the complainantÕs may consist of an unsupported 
assertion) is very perilous.43 
 
A good example of a successful argument on the 
disappearance of islands of fact is P.OÕC. Although decided under 
the pre-S.H. law, it clearly demonstrates the problems at the heart 
of historic child sexual abuse cases. P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. concerned a 
complaint made 14 years after the alleged offences.44 
Significantly, the complainant graphically described how the 
applicant would lock the door of a room before committing the 
offences. The High Court45 found that because he was the childÕs 
music teacher and knew the boyÕs parents, and because of the 
expert evidence given, the delay was clearly referable to the 
accusedÕs own actions. However, the charges were more specific 
than in most sexual abuse trials. Most importantly, details relating 
to the locks and keys of the music room doors would have been 
clear in the memory of the accused and his colleagues had the 
charges been brought sooner. However, the evidence of this had 
clearly disappeared. If it were possible to demonstrate that the 
complainantÕs account of the locking of the doors was untrue, 
then the credibility of the complainant's entire account of the 
incident could be seriously undermined. Therefore, McGuinness 
J. held that there was specific prejudice to the accused in the 
preparation of his defence. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, Keane C.J. applied the 
test set down in P.C.,46 and found that the delay in reporting was 
explicable by reference to the accusedÕs actions, assuming them 
to be true.47 In relation to specific prejudice, the accusedÕs 
_____________________________________________________ 
43 P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22, per Hardiman J. dissenting. 
44 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. and the President of the Circuit Court (High Court, 4 
March 1999). The Supreme CourtÕs judgment is reported at [2000] 3 I.R. 87. 
The indictment contained five counts of indecent assault on dates between 
January 1982 and December 1983. 
45 Decision of Mc Guinness J. 
46 [1999] 2 I.R. 25. 
47 This was because of the disparity of ages and the teacher/pupil relationship, 
coupled with the uncontradicted evidence of the clinical psychologist. 
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solicitor had placed before the Court, material that went beyond a 
bald assertion of prejudice. Indeed there was evidence that when 
enquiries were made of the director of the college at the time,  
he stated that Ò[d]etails such as those you seek constitute the 
minutiae that fade from memory simply because they seem of no 
particular import at the timeÓ.48 Had the trial taken place within a 
reasonable time, there would have been little difficulty in testing 
the accuracy of the complainant's version of events.  
The prosecutionÕs appeal was not allowed. 
It is far from clear that, had P.OÕC. been decided under 
the S.H. test, the order of prohibition would have been granted. 
Certainly, from an examination of the cases decided since  
S.H. v. D.P.P., it would appear that the courts have adopted a 
stricter approach to arguments based on the disappearance of 
islands of fact. Indeed, the disappearance of an island of fact 
argument has been rejected where the accused argued specific 
prejudice on a number of grounds, relating to the disappearance 
of oral and documentary evidence.  
This arose in C.K. v. D.P.P., where three witnesses had 
died, and the van in which the assault was alleged to have taken 
place had been destroyed, along with its insurance records.49 It 
was argued that the absence of this oral and documentary 
evidence deprived the accused of certain Òislands of factÓ upon 
which reliance could otherwise be placed by the defence, to test 
the reliability of the complainantÕs account. The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument, concluding that there was no evidential 
basis sufficient to justify the prohibition of the trial.50  
_____________________________________________________ 
48 [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 92, per Hardiman J. 
49 For example, the complainant alleged that some of the offences took place 
while the accused was babysitting her. The accused denied that he regularly 
babysat the complainant and asserted that the complainantÕs grandmother had 
taken care of the children when the complainantÕs parents were out.  
The accused asserted that the death of the complainantÕs grandmother meant 
that he could not put her version of events to the jury. The complainant alleged 
that one offence took place in a particular field. The accused asserted that he 
could only access this field with the permission of the owner, who had since 
died: C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5. 
50 C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5. The Court held that the complainantÕs 
deceased grandmother could have had little or nothing to say on what 
babysitting arrangements were in place when she was not present. Equally, in 
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On the other hand, in a case involving no delay, the trial 
was prohibited due to a risk of unfairness flowing from the loss of 
telephone records, where an important part of the allegations was 
that the accused would call or text the complainant on her mobile 
phone asking her to come to his apartment.51  
 
2. Prosecution Evidence and Statements Reduce the Likelihood of 
a Successful Application 
It would seem that the more evidence and statements that 
are gathered by the prosecuting authorities, the less willing the 
reviewing court will be to grant prohibition. The issue of the 
unavailability of witnesses arose in a recent case where a former 
secretary of a parentsÕ association and member of the church 
choir was charged with rape and sexual assault against three 
complainants. The delay involved was 35 years.52 While 
prejudice resulting from the death of a number of witnesses was 
alleged, the most crucial was the death of the accusedÕs mother, 
who shared a bedroom with the accused. However, the High 
Court rejected the claim of prejudice, holding that the 
complainant had neither confirmed nor denied that the accusedÕs 
mother was present during the abuse, and that any credibility 
issues could be tested on cross-examination. The Book of 
Evidence in the case contained numerous statements from the 
complainants and from other witnesses, against whom no 
prejudice was alleged, and this was a decisive factor in the 
CourtÕs finding that the accused would not risk an unfair trial. 
 
3. Attempts Should be Made to Locate Alternative Evidence 
The difficulties presented by the disappearance of islands 
of fact are further compounded by the requirement that accused 
persons must show not only that relevant witnesses or evidence 
have disappeared, but also that there are no other alternative 
witnesses or evidence available. Therefore the accused must 
demonstrate that serious attempts have been made to locate 
alternative witnesses and evidence. Indeed, in one case, the loss 
                                                                                                           
relation to the field there was no evidence that the gate was ever locked, or that 
access to it could only be obtained by way of the owner. 
51 R.C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.S.C. 32.  
52 C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J.). 
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of the accusedÕs training diaries and the death of two relevant 
witnesses was not enough to establish actual prejudice in a case 
involving a delay of 16 years, where the accused failed to seek 
out the whereabouts of alternative witnesses.53 Similarly, the loss 
of the accusedÕs work records and the death of a witness who 
might have been in a position to vouch for the accusedÕs 
whereabouts was not enough to establish prejudice, where on the 
evening in question there was a family christening with a 
gathering of the family, and so it was likely that other witnesses 
as to the accusedÕs behaviour on that occasion would be 
available.54 
The burden on the accused may be heavier where the 
abuse is alleged to have occurred in an institutional setting.  
In D.D. v. D.P.P.,55 the accused was a 78-year-old Christian 
Brother and former director of an industrial school, charged with 
ten counts of indecent assault and one count of assault against six 
pupils of the school during the mid to late 1970s and early 1980s. 
The accused claimed actual prejudice on a number of grounds:  
his recollection of events was no longer clear; the death of several 
potential witnesses; the disappearance of documentary records 
concerning a broken window mentioned in one complaint;  
the death of a witness who could have given evidence as to 
whether or not the defendant had access a room where some of 
the offences were alleged to have taken place; and the demolition 
of particular school buildings where certain offences were alleged 
to have taken place. However the Supreme Court held that the 
accused had not gone far enough: the nature of the offences was 
that they occurred in secret. Any evidence which the deceased 
witnesses could have given would at best have been peripheral. 
Central to the CourtÕs decision was the accusedÕs failure to 
indicate whether any of the evidence that the three deceased 
witnesses would have given was available from any other source: 
 
The applicant has not engaged with the circumstances 
of the case in that he has not indicated whether any of 
the evidence which the three deceased witnesses would 
_____________________________________________________ 
53 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 5, [2008] 4 I.R. 76. 
54 J.K. v D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 56. 
55 [2008] I.E.S.C. 47.  
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give is available from some other source. In a case such 
as the present where the community of the Christian 
Brothers was presumably numerous and the residents 
of the industrial school ever more numerous,  
the appellant ought at least to have recounted his efforts 
to obtain such evidence as he might wish to adduce 
from other sources.56 
 
Nor had the accused made any attempt to obtain witnesses 
who could give evidence regarding the layout of the demolished 
buildings.57 
 
4. The Accused must Demonstrate the Serious Nature of the 
Prejudice Suffered 
The prejudice suffered must be demonstrated to be 
extremely serious, particularly where loss of memory is alleged. 
In a case involving allegations of abuse against a former Christian 
Brother dating back almost 40 years,58 submissions of prejudice 
based on the accusedÕs depression and grave pre-trial anxiety 
suffered as a result of vilification in the media59 was not 
sufficient to stop the trial, when the accused had receive medical 
care but had not submitted a medical report. The applicant also 
deposed that he could only recollect four of the fifteen 
complainants. Indeed, his police interviews were Òlittered with 
references to his inability to remember persons and 
_____________________________________________________ 
56 Per Finnegan J., Fennelly and Macken JJ. concurring. 
57 The accused also argued prejudice on the ground of the lack of the 
specificity of the charges. Indeed, each of the offences was alleged to have 
been perpetrated Òon a date unknownÓ over various time periods, ranging from 
4 months to 7 years. He succeeded in having his trial on one charge prohibited, 
which related to a single incident within a time span of seven years.  
However the Court allowed the D.P.P.Õs cross appeal against an order of 
prohibition relating to charges concerning two incidents over a six-year period. 
The Court held that even though the charges spanned 6 years, the two incidents 
could be pinned down to the year 1978. Unfortunately the D.P.P. had not 
narrowed the time period down in charging the accused.  
58 J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20. 
59 The High Court had found that some of the information given to the media 
had been leaked by the Garda. However the Supreme Court did not place 
much emphasis on this point, stating that the majority of the information 
relating to the alleged abuse had come from the complainants or people 
speaking on their behalf. 
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circumstancesÓ.60 However, the Supreme Court held that the 
evidence relating to the applicantÕs memory was vague and 
ambiguous, and there was no medical evidence on the issue. The 
approach adopted by the court in this case is a sensible one, and is 
aimed at preventing spurious and unfounded claims of prejudice 
halting trials; clearly the accused could easily have obtained a 
medical report grounding the claim of loss of memory.  
The Supreme Court is very careful to contextualise the 
accused
_____________________________________________________ 
 personÕs claim of prejudice. In S.A. v. D.P.P.61 the 
accused faced charges of abuse allegedly perpetrated while he 
was a Christian Brother working at the former Artane industrial 
school. The number of charges alone was staggering: eight 
allegations of buggery, 63 charges of indecent assault, and one of 
attempted buggery. The oldest charge dated back 46 years, and 
the latest 38 years. The trial judge held that the delay Òcould not 
rationally be considered to be anything other than inordinateÓ. 
Crucially, however, there were certain features of the case which 
mitigated the effect of the long periods of delay in the case.  
The accused had given extensive interviews to the garda, and 
these appeared to demonstrate that the applicantÕs memory was 
functioning and accurate, and that he showed Òa marked instinct 
for precisionÓ. Furthermore, during the course of the interviews, 
the applicant made certain admissions relating to acts that were 
Òin the nature of inappropriate touchingÓ. The applicant was 
alleged to have said that these incidents occurred Òin moments of 
human weaknessÓ, and that Òif the boys have said this, he must 
accept it, but that he has no recollection of it. He must accept 
what they have said on trust. His memory is not as good as it used 
to be É something must have taken placeÓ. He also said that he 
remembered two complainants, and he made specific admissions 
of conduct in relation to one boy. The Court held that Ò[h]is 
admissions are at least open to the interpretation that he also 
concedes conduct of this sort with other, unnamed boysÓ.  
The accused could not say how often he experienced Òmoments 
of weaknessÓ, and did not know if he had behaved in a similar 
way with other boys. The Court held that the inability to recall 
60 J.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 20. 
61 [2007] I.E.S.C. 43, per Hardiman J., Macken and Finnegan JJ. concurring. 
All quotations in this paragraph are taken from the judgment of Hardiman J. 
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specific children by name was not gravely prejudicial to the 
defence.62 The admissions did not appear to have been denied or 
glossed, so it was reasonable to take them at face value.  
The applicantÕs appeal was refused. However, it must be 
remembered that this was a case of undisputed admissions.  
The Court specifically distinguished it from cases where alleged 
admissions are hotly disputed and not independently verified. 
Presumably, in such cases, the weight to be given to alleged 
admissions would be significantly less. 
 
5. The Presumption of Innocence and the Prohibition 
f the pre-S.H. case law have been heard in two 
recent 





prohibition decisions, where the court has taken assertions 
of innocence as negating the claim of prejudice, and have looked 
for a causal link between the delay and the prejudice alleged by 
the accused. 
The p
. v. D.P.P.,63 which involved charges dating back 28 
years. There, the Supreme Court considered pre-charge 
correspondence between the accusedÕs and the complainantÕs 
solicitors, in which the accused denied the allegations, and 
eventually issued proceedings for defamation. A statement 
contained in this correspondence stating that the accused would 
vigorously defend any future criminal prosecution, should one be 
brought, was taken to constitute evidence that the applicant by his 
own admission could not be prejudiced by reason of the delay: 
ÒCrucially and centrally É is the fact that the applicant, 
effectively, through his own mouth, makes it abundantly clear 
that he has not been prejudiced in any way as a result of the 
significant delay which has undoubtedly taken placeÓ. It is 
difficult to identify the rationale/principle underpinning the 
courtÕs decision: where is the link between the accusedÕs 
protestations of innocence and the conclusion that he has not 
62 Despite the general nature of the admissions (the fact that they did not 
extend to buggery; and the fact that the statements all related to boys and made 
no mention of the female complainant), they were still a significant factor. 
63 [2007] I.E.S.C. 24. Direct quotations taken from the judgment of Kearns J., 
Denham and Hardiman JJ concurring. 
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suffered prejudice Ð would a less adamant invocation of the 
constitutional right to the presumption of innocence have been 
indicative of prejudice? The decision is confusing, and should be 
distinguished in future cases.  
The Supreme Court sought a causal link between the delay 
and the prejudice alleged in R. McC. v. D.P.P.,64 in which the 
accused was charged with eight counts of sexual assault and one 
of unlawful carnal knowledge against his daughter in the mid 
1990s. A formal complaint was not made until October 2001.  
In the course of an interview with garda, the accused had alleged 
his brother had witnessed a conversation between the accused and 
the complainant in which the complainant admitted the falsity of 
the allegations. The accused argued that the death of his brother 
in 2002 constituted prejudice such that he ran the real and serious 
risk of an unfair trial. In the course of the judgment, the Supreme 
Court made reference to the fact that Òthe [applicant] must show 
that the complainant unduly and unreasonably delayed in making 
her complaint if he is able to rely on it in combination with the 
prejudice he allegesÓ. It is suggested that this statement is 
inconsistent with the decision in S.H. that the reasons for the 
delay are no longer relevant. Nevertheless, the crux of the 
decision related to the issue of the deceased witness. The Court 
held that the allegedly important piece of evidence did not come 
into existence until almost the end of the period of delay.65 It was 
in this context that the Court (somewhat confusingly, given the 
decision in S.H.) held that the accusedÕs biggest problem was that 
there was Òno causal link between the complainantÕs alleged 
delay and the loss of this piece of evidenceÓ. It would appear that 
the main reason for the CourtÕs decision was that the missing 
piece of evidence only arose towards the end of the delay period. 
However, it is far from clear why less weight should be attached 
to a prejudice that arises at the end of the delay period, as 
opposed to one that accrues at a time nearer the commission of 
the alleged offence. It is suggested that there is no relation 
between when the prejudice accrued and its prejudicial effect on 
_____________________________________________________ 
64 [2007] I.E.S.C. 29. Direct quotations taken from the judgment of Fennelly J., 
Denham J. and Finnegan P. concurring. 
65 Furthermore the accusedÕs account of the conversation could be put to the 
garda witnesses and the complainant in cross-examination at trial. 
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the accused personÕs ability to present his defence, and that this 
case should not be viewed as establishing a precedent for future 
cases.  
 
D. Exceptional Circumstances: The Omnibus Argument 
In S.H. the Supreme Court retained a residual discretion to 
grant an order of prohibition in exceptional circumstances where 
it would be unfair to proceed with the prosecution.  
Such exceptional circumstances have been found where a number 
of factors, including the fact that the accused was an elderly man 
of 86 years of age and in bad health, meant that in order to protect 
the integrity of the justice system the trial should be prohibited.66 
Denham J. was keen to emphasise that the justice system was not 
based on vengeance, nor should it be perceived as being so 
based.67  
Nevertheless, bad health and age will not always be 
sufficient to constitute exceptional circumstances. Advanced age 
and claims of unfitness to stand trial by reason of physical and 
mental disability have not been accepted by the Supreme Court as 
amounting to exceptional circumstances.68 It was stressed that the 
ability of the applicant to stand trial was effectively a matter for 
the trial judge. Indeed the Supreme Court has gone even further, 
stressing that the issue of capacity and fitness to plead is a matter 
for the trial judge, and it is an error for the High Court to make a 
determination regarding the Òalleged cognitive impairment of the 
accusedÓ.69  
The exceptional circumstances test is not limited to the 
ailments of the applicant. Indeed, in M.G. v. D.P.P., attempts by 
the complainant to use the criminal courts as an instrument of 
blackmail, in order to extract money from the accused, have come 
within the test.70 The Court held that Òit redounds to the credit of 
_____________________________________________________ 
66 P.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 39, [2008] 1 I.R. 701. The integrity of the 
criminal process was also cited, in addition to the right to a fair trial, as a 
ground for an order of prohibition in C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400. 
67 P.T. v. D.P.P. [2008] 1 I.R. 701, at 710, per Denham J. 
68 J.K. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 56. 
69 D.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 2.  
70 M.G. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 4; [2007] 2 I.R. 738. The Court noted  
Òa singular distinguishing featureÓ of the case was that the complainant 
Òpersistently and repeatedly resorted to threats, combined with demands for 
 
                      Judicial Studies Institute Journal            [2009:2 22 
the applicant that, although he was clearly vulnerable to 
allegations of this type, he never paid or offered to pay anything 
as the price of the complainantÕs silenceÓ.71 While the decision in 
M.G. vindicates due process rights, it does not sit comfortably 
alongside the decision in W.M.,72 where the accusedÕs efforts to 
clear his name were fatal to his claim of prejudice.73  
The dissonance between the two decisions precludes the 
discovery of any clear principle.  
In addition to the exceptional circumstances test in S.H.,  
it is clear that as a general rule the reviewing court is entitled to 
consider the Òomnibus argumentÓ or the Òtotality of the 
circumstancesÓ, whereby the cumulative effect of all the relevant 
factors, including delay, is considered as a ground for granting 
prohibition.74 In a lengthy judgment earlier this year, 
MacMenamin J. found this totality of the circumstances test to be 
compatible with the S.H. test.75 The refusal of the prosecution to 
take a statement from the complainantÕs mother, added to other 
factors (including the accusedÕs advanced age, blindness and 
infirmity) has also grounded an order of prohibition.76 Similarly, 
                                                                                                           
money, of exposure of the applicantÕs sexual proclivities. He ultimately 
resorted to a physical attack on the applicantÕs property. These threats were 
combined with offers to withdraw charges in consideration of money 
paymentsÓ: [2007] 3 I.R. 738, at 746, per Fennelly J. 
71 [2007] 3 I.R. 738, at 746, per Fennelly J., Murray C.J. and Hardiman J. 
concurring. 
72 [2007] I.E.S.C. 24. 
73 In a creative twist, the S.H. exceptional circumstances test has also been used 
to halt the summary trial of a minor for arson. In A.C. (a minor) v. D.P.P., 
Dunne J. held that the emotional and mental vulnerability of the applicant 
meant that the case came with the wholly exceptional circumstances test 
established in S.H., so that it would be unfair or unjust to put her on trial; 
[2008] I.E.H.C. 39, [2008] 3 I.R 398. However it should be noted that the case 
centred on prosecutorial delay. This article does not consider prosecutorial 
delay, on which see P.M. v. Malone [2002] 2 I.R. 560; P.M. v. D.P.P. [2006] 
I.E.S.C. 22, [2006] 3 I.R. 172; T.H. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 48, [2006] 3 I.R. 
520; P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22; and OÕH. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 12. 
74 J.M. v. D.P.P. [2004] I.E.S.C. 47, and D.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 47; 
J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48; P.T. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 39; [2008] 1 
I.R. 78. 
75 J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48 (MacMenamin J.). 
76 R.. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87 (OÕNeill J). The case involved a delay of 30 
years. 
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quite apart from the S.H. test, the Court has identified an Òinterest 
of justiceÓ jurisdiction justifying the prohibition to be activated by 
the cumulative effect of: the CourtÕs duty to protect due process; 
the fact that the proceedings had been before the courts in one 
form or another for six years; and the issue of the severance of the 
charges.77 
 
E. Prohibition Applications: Comment 
It is clear that persons charged with historic offences of 
child sexual abuse face considerable challenges in trying to show 
prejudice. The problems in demonstrating prejudice are 
exacerbated if the complainant fails to offer specific information 
regarding the circumstances of the alleged offence(s). Indeed, as 
Hardiman J. has noted, a person in whose case there is an Òisland 
of factÓ is perhaps, ironically, both in a potentially better position 
to face a trial (because evidence may not, after all, prove 
irretrievable) and in a better position to demonstrate prejudice in 
an application for prohibition. By contrast a person who cannot 
point to any island of fact is not only in what he called Òa very 
perilous position at a trialÓ,78 but is also unable on a prohibition 
application to show any prejudice to his defence. It is clear the 
threshold for establishing the serious nature of the prejudice 
suffered is very high indeed, with some lingering importance still 
being accorded to issues such as the accusedÕs (alleged) role in 
causing the delay and the time when the prejudice accrued.  
These factors are irrelevant to a consideration of fairness. 
Hardiman J. has indicated that, where prejudice arises 
from lost or missing evidence or witnesses, there is an onus on the 
prosecution to show that the relevant aspect of a given defence 
can be proven by alternative means.79 It is suggested that the 
shifting of the onus onto the prosecution to show alternative 
avenues of defence so that the accused is not confined to a bare 
_____________________________________________________ 
77 D.S. v. Judges of the Circuit Court and the D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 37, [2009] 
1 I.L.R.M. 16. 
78 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 118, per Hardiman J. 
79 ÒIt seems to me that the Director has been able to point to the probable 
availability from other sources of at least the essence of the É evidence, and 
that this is sufficient to avoid the inference that there is a real or serious risk of 
an unfair trialÓ: P.H. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 3, per Hardiman J. 
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denial, would more properly safeguard the accusedÕs right to due 
process and to a fair trial. This is particularly important given 
that, since the abolition of the preliminary examination,  
the prosecution no longer has to show a prima facie case against 
the accused.80 Such a development would also ensure the 
prosecution disclose all relevant evidence relating to the 
complainantÕs state of mind when reporting.81  
Furthermore, while the utilisation of the exceptional 
circumstances or cumulative factors test is to be welcomed, it is 
suggested that the fact-specific nature of the courtsÕ decisions in 
these cases offer little guidance to trial judges in future cases.  
Instead of ordering prohibition, the courts prefer to rely on 
the trial judgeÕs ability to rule on evidential issues and to issue 
directions to the jury on the effect of the delay on the accusedÕs 
defence.82 This is not necessarily problematic, in itself, however 
when viewed in conjunction with the lack of guidance offered to 
trial judges and to juries on the effects of delay, the risk of an 
unfair trial is unconstitutionally high. The next section considers 
the case law of the Court of Criminal Appeal in historic child 
sexual abuse prosecutions. 
 
 
IV. UNAVOIDABLE UNFAIRNESS OF TRIAL:  
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL AND GUIDANCE FOR TRIAL 
JUDGES IN HISTORIC CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 
On a prohibition application the accused person must 
show that the prejudice caused by the delay in reporting is not 
only such that he or she runs the real and serious risk of an unfair 
trial, but also that the prejudice is not remediable by way of 
rulings and directions by the trial judge.83 Only if both limbs of 
the test are satisfied is the defendant entitled to an order of 
prohibition.84 The Supreme Court has reiterated its awareness of 
_____________________________________________________ 
80 Criminal Justice Act, 1999, s. 9. 
81 The issue of disclosure of medical and psychiatric records is discussed 
below. 
82 ÒThe unfairness must be irremediableÓ: R. McC. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C 29, 
per Fennelly J.; Denham J. and Finnegan P. concurring. 
83 S.H. v D.P.P. [2006] 3 I.R. 575. 
84 C.K. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 5. 
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the dangers involved in a trial of historic child sexual abuse and 
has emphasised that these dangers are best dealt with by 
directions and rulings from the trial judge, Òwho has the 
opportunity to see and hear observe witnesses and will guard 
against an unfair trialÓ.85 However, while the courts have 
repeatedly emphasised the importance of the judgeÕs warnings 
and directions on delay in historic cases, and have even described 
the duty to give such appropriate warnings as an obligation,86 
there is a distinct lack of guidance coming from the reviewing 
courts on how best to advise the jury and how to rule on issues 
flowing from the delay. It is therefore useful to consider the case 
law emanating from the Court of Criminal Appeal on directions 
and rulings by trial judges in delay cases.   
  
A. Directions to the Jury on the Problems Caused by Delay 
There is a paucity of guidance from the Court of Criminal 
Appeal on the contents of the required direction and the absence 
of specific guidelines has led to difficulties for trial judges in 
formulating appropriate directions.87 
The length of the delay is not always the determining 
factor in deciding whether a warning should be given;  
the warning is supposed to mitigate any prejudice caused to the 
accused, and not to be a formulaic response to a lapse of time.88 
The content of the warning is usually determined by the prejudice 
caused to the defence by the delay. On a number of occasions,89 
the Court of Criminal Appeal has approved the warning given by 
Haugh J. in the High Court in The People (D.P.P.) v. R.B.90 
Running to some 100 lines, it warns of the dangers of a contest of 
_____________________________________________________ 
85 B.J. v. D.P.P. [2007] I.E.S.C. 18. 
86 C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 121 (Peart J.). 
87 McGrath, Evidence (Thomson Round Hall, 2005), p.181. 
88 See Coonan and Foley, The JudgeÕs Charge in Criminal Trials (Thomson 
Round Hall, 2008), p. 497, and the comments of Hamilton P. in Z. v D.P.P. 
[1994] 2 I.R. 476, at 495. 
89 The People (D.P.P.) v. P.J. [2003] 3 I.R. 550; The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C. 
[2006] I.E.C.C.A. 69, [2007] 1 I.R. 749; The People (D.P.P.) v C.C. [2006] 4 
I.R. 287; D. W. v. D.P.P. [2003] I.E.S.C 54. 
90 Court of Criminal Appeal, unreported, 12 February 2003. The warning is 
reproduced in full in Coonan and Foley, The JudgeÕs Charge in Criminal 
Trials (n. 88 above), pp. 498-500. 
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credibility, particularly when there is a lack of detail in the 
complaints due to the delay. Haugh J.Õs warning specifically notes 
that the prejudice to the defence caused by delay is much greater 
than the prejudice caused to the prosecution, when memories 
have deteriorated: ÒÉ to prosecute it is easier if you do not nail 
your colours to the mast because there is less you can be cross-
examined onÓ. This dictum is very similar in tenor to the remarks 
made by Hardiman J. regarding the prejudice caused by 
allegations that do not contain any Òisland of factÓ.91 
Unfortunately for trial judges and for accused persons, however, 
the R.B. warning does not go far enough Ð as Hardiman J. has 
noted,92 it simply points out the dangers, without offering advice 
to the jury on how to act on them.  
A complete failure to direct the jury on the effects of delay 
in any real way was fatal where the trial judge dealt with the issue 
of delay in his summing up in a superficial manner, merely telling 
the jury that Òthese incidents happened more or less a quarter of a 
century agoÓ.93 He neglected to explain fully the consequences of 
the delay, and told the jury to Òremember the length of time that 
has passedÓ.94 The Court of Criminal Appeal held that while it 
was not always necessary to go into as much detail as was given 
in the R.B. warning, it was nevertheless satisfied that the trial 
judge should have dealt Òreasonably fullyÓ with all the problems 
caused by the delay in this case.95 The Court of Criminal Appeal 
has also found a failure to contextualise the warning to be fatal 
where the trial judge neglected to mention that the complainantÕs 
story was uncorroborated, the events in question had happened 
almost 22 years earlier and no contemporaneous complaint was 
made.96 
The trial judge must go beyond a general warning on the 
effects of delay, and must remind the jury of any specific 
_____________________________________________________ 
91 P.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 118, per Hardiman J. 
92 P.OÕC. v D.P.P. (previous note).   
93 The People (D.P.P.) v. P.J. [2003] 3 I.R. 550, at 564. 
94 [2003] 3 I.R. 550, at 564-565. 
95 These included the fact the death of the complainantÕs mother and 
grandmother before the complaint was made, and the fact that certain medical 
and psychiatric evidence was now unavailable. 
96 The People (D.P.P.) v. Gentleman [2003] 4 I.R. 22. 
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problems caused to the defence by the passage of time, such as 
the death of a member of the accusedÕs family and the difficulty 
in gathering evidence as to whether he was living in the house at 
the time of the alleged offences.97 However the Court of Criminal 
Appeal is keen to emphasise the fact-specific nature of their 
judgments in such cases, and so their potential value as guidance 
is limited.98  
In The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C., the lack of a warning also 
grounded an appeal, even though delay was dealt with as a 
preliminary matter, and counsel had failed to make requisitions 
on the requirement to give a warning, in circumstances where the 
failure to direct went to Òa central and critical aspect of [the] 
whole caseÓ.99 The Court placed emphasis on two factors apart 
from the delay: there were a number of complaints and various 
complainants; and the fact that some of the complainants were 
very young at the time of the alleged offences was a factor which 
of itself would suggest the requirement for a warning. The Court 
refused to set out the warning which should have been given, but 
held that there were some elements of corroboration that were 
present which would dictate the nature of the warning to be given. 
For example, the system described by the various complainants 
was very similar, and the applicant admitted being present in the 
Savoy cinema with one of the complainants when an offence was 
alleged to have occurred. Interestingly, the Court in E.C. 
considered that the R.B. direction, although a good example of a 
delay warning, was not Òappropriate to the present case, or to 
every other caseÓ.100  
In a recent decision, the Court held that there is a range of 
possible sample jury charges to be given between the very bare 
one given in D.P.P. v. C.C.101 and the more detailed one given in 
_____________________________________________________ 
97 The People (D.P.P.) v L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517, [2003] I.E.C.C.A. 138. 
98 The Court held that these were Òincidents of possible prejudice which were 
specific to these proceedingsÓ: [2003] 2 I.R. 517, at 529. 
99 The People (D.P.P.) v. E.C. [2006] I.E.C.C.A. 69; [2007] 1 IR 749, at 759. 
The Court ordered a retrial. 
100 [2007] 1 IR 749, at 758. 
101 Where the Trial judge stated: ÒAs to the timeframe É I think I harped on 
that repeatedly, highlighting all the contentions, the length of time ago and the 
frailties and the question of Ð I harped, I remember, on witness memories and 
so on, so I think the course of the charge in its entirety adequately met that 
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R.B. or The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke.102 The exact nature of the 
charge to be given depends on the particular circumstances of the 
case. 
While the CourtÕs willingness to respond to the fact-
sensitive nature of these cases demonstrates the flexibility of the 
common law system, the resulting lack of principles and guidance 
for trial judges is problematic from a due process perspective. It is 
the opinion of this writer that, while it is important for the 
warning on delay to be contextualised to fit the facts of the case at 
hand, specific guidance on issues common to all historic child 
sexual abuse prosecutions should be offered to the jury. Issues 
such as the weight to be given to the fact of delayed reporting 
when assessing the credibility and reliability of the complainantÕs 
account are crucial. Warnings on the lack of medical and other 
forensic evidence, which would be available were the 
complainant made contemporaneously, could also be given.  
Such standardised warnings are particularly important given that 
a failure to requisition may be fatal to an appeal where the trial 
judge has given some warning on delay.103  
Further issues arise in relation to cases involving multiple 
complainants. Historic child sexual abuse prosecutions often 
involve numerous complainants, many of whom allege offences 
very similar in nature against the accused. The need for an 
adequate warning on delay increases in cases involving multiple 
complainants.104 In The People (D.P.P.) v C.C.105 the Court of 
Criminal Appeal quashed the appellantÕs conviction for 180 
counts of indecent assault and ordered a retrial. The delay ranged 
                                                                                                           
tooÓ: The People (D.P.P.) v C.C. [2006] 4 I.R 287, at 293, per Kearns J., 
OÕDonovan, Gilligan JJ. concurring  
102 The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 55. 
103 See The People (D.P.P.) v. T.OÕR. [2008] I.E.C.C.A. 38. The Court noted 
that while the trial judge had not dealt with all of the points canvassed by 
defence counsel in his closing speech regarding the consequences of the delay, 
he had not been requisitioned in relation to his failure to do so As a result the 
Court dismissed this ground of appeal. See also Coonan and Foley (above,  
n. 88), p. 505. 
104 Coonan and Foley, The JudgeÕs Charge in Criminal Trials (above, n. 88),  
p. 503. See also The People (D.P.P.) v E.C. [2007] 1 I.R. 749; S.H. v. D.P.P. 
[2006] 3 I.R. 575. 
105 The People (D.P.P.) v. C.C. [2006] 4 I.R. 287. 
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from 28 to 37 years. The case involved six complainants who 
alleged abuse over a nine-year period when the appellant was 
their primary school teacher. The appellant was convicted of 
abusing the complainants during class in front of a classroom of 
pupils. Two of the complainants had no memory of the abuse 
when they were initially approached by garda. The Court of 
Criminal Appeal held that the prejudice caused by delay in the 
case of a single complainant: 
 
É  can only be seen as exponentially magnified where 
there are multiple complainants and a single accused. 
His difficulties of recollection, his difficulties in 
finding witnesses, or of even remembering the identity 
of individual complainants are all magnified in direct 
relation to the number of complainants who come 
forward. So, while the difficulties of delay may in such 
circumstances recede to some degree from the 
prosecutionÕs point of view, they are multiplied and 
exaggerated from a defendantÕs point of view.106  
 
In a recent decision, the Court of Criminal Appeal has 
offered some helpful guidance on the issue of corroboration and 
multiple complainants, where the sexual assaults were alleged to 
have occurred simultaneously or in the presence of the other 
complainants.107 The Court held that that, there was no reason in 
law why, exceptionally, where the offences were not committed 
in private, the eye-witness evidence of one complainant cannot 
corroborate the evidence of another complainant, provided that 
other criteria are met and that no valid argument is made against 
it.108 However, in the vast majority of cases the offences are 
_____________________________________________________ 
106 [2006] 4 I.R. 287, at 296. The trial judge should have dwelt Òat some 
lengthÓ on the difficulties facing a defendant in old cases, particularly where 
no complaints were made in the aftermath of the offences and where there 
were few Òislands of factÓ which would enable a defendant to identify 
inconsistencies in the complainantÕs evidence and to address his mind in a 
specific way to the presence or otherwise of Òcertain physical arrangements or 
features of the environment in which it is alleged the various offences took 
placeÓ.  
107 The People (D.P.P.) v. Cooke [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 55. 
108 Furthermore, the jury need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the 
accusedÕs guilt in respect of a complainant in order for a co-complainantÕs 
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carried out in private, and so the guidance offered in this case is 
limited.  
Defendants are more likely to be convicted in joint trials 
of multiple allegations.109 Despite the potentially probative nature 
of multiple accusations, the jury must be warned against having 
regard to the cumulative effect of evidence in respect of offences 
of the same character.110 It is suggested that more guidance from 
the Court of Criminal Appeal on how to deal with multiple 
allegations and multiple complainants is needed in order to 
safeguard defendantsÕ due process rights.  
 
B. The Need for Guidance on Evidential Rulings 
The ease with which inadmissible evidence impinging on 
the presumption of innocence might emerge, in spite of rulings by 
the trial judge, was clearly illustrated in a case earlier this year.  
In order to demonstrate that the absence of particular defence 
witness was not material, the prosecution witness gave evidence 
relating back to an account of an assault perpetrated by the 
accused years earlier, which apparently took place within a very 
short time and in the victimÕs house. Such evidence was 
Òillustrative of the formidable challenges that might face the 
defence and a trial judge in seeking to ring-fence or segregate 
evidential issuesÓ.111 
Cases involving multiple complainants pose additional 
challenges, in relation to the admissibility of similar fact evidence 
                                                                                                           
independent and admissible eye witness evidence to be corroborative of the 
offence.  
109 See Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse (above,  
n. 11) at p. 201; Horowitz and others, ÒA Comparison of Verdicts Obtained in 
Severed and Joined Criminal TrialsÓ (1980) 10 Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology 444, at 453-454.  
110 The People (D.P.P.) v. L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517. In The People (D.P.P.) v. 
B.K. [2000] 2 I.R. 199 the offences were alleged to have been committed 
against young boys in a residential home for children from the Travelling 
Community. The Court of Criminal Appeal concluded that in respect of 
specific counts concerning different boys, the manner in which the offences 
were alleged to have been committed differed to such an extent that a joint trial 
of the counts had created an unfair prejudice resulting in an unsatisfactory trial.  
111 J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48, per MacMenamin J. 
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and applications for joinder or severance of the charges.112  
In relation to admissibility, the courts will admit evidence of the 
defendantÕs previous misconduct, if it is relevant and the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect.113  
The considerations of relevance and the probative versus the 
prejudicial value of the evidence are merged in the courtÕs focus 
on the balancing exercise.114 The balancing of probative value 
against prejudicial effect has been criticised on the grounds that 
the two are incommensurable.115 Nevertheless, where the alleged 
abuse offences are alleged to have been committed by the same 
person, then the probative value of the evidence increases: 
 
É the probative value of multiple accusations may 
depend in part on their similarity, but also on the 
unlikelihood that the same person would find himself 
falsely accused on various occasions by different and 
independent individuals. The making of multiple 
accusations is a coincidence in itself, which has to be 
taken into account in deciding admissibility.116 
 
Lewis notes that in some circumstances, evidence of a specific 
propensity will be relied on by the prosecution, and reasoning 
from evidence of this specific propensity on one count will be 
permissible in relation to another.117 Alternatively, the 
prosecution may rely on the improbability of coincidence 
_____________________________________________________ 
112 It is of course extremely difficult for trial judges to make decisions on 
admissibility at the outset of the trial. However in The People (D.P.P.) v L.G. 
[2003] 2 I.R. 517 the Court held that the trial judge, when ruling on 
applications for separate trials, should also have expressly ruled on the 
question of the admissibility of similar fact evidence at the same time.  
113 B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140; R. v. Christie [1914] A.C. 545. 
114 Maher cites B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140 and The People (D.P.P.) v B.K. 
[2000] 2 I.R. 199 as examples of the effect of this balancing exercise.  
See Maher, ÒDevelopments in Bad Character Evidence: Undermining the 
AccusedÕs ShieldÓ (2007) 14  D.U.L.J. 57, at 58. 
115 See Zuckerman, Principles of Criminal Evidence (Clarendon Press, 1989), 
pp. 232-233; Carter, ÒForbidden Reasoning Permissible: Similar Fact Evidence 
a decade after BoardmanÓ (1985) 48 M.L.R. 29, at 36. 
116 B. v. D.P.P. [1997] 3 I.R. 140, at 157, per Budd J. See also The People 
(D.P.P.) v L.G. [2003] 2 I.R. 517. 
117 See generally Lewis, Delayed Prosecutions for Childhood Sexual Abuse 
(above, n. 11), ch. 8. 
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between allegations made by different complainants.118 Guidance 
on how Òcross-admissibilityÓ between the charges is to be shaped 
by principles of constitutional due process would be most useful 
for trial judges.  
 
C. The Memory Minefield  
How credibility is constructed, and how certain truths are 
validated or discounted, is central to the production of public 
truths in the form of convictions and acquittals. However, despite 
the importance placed by the Irish courts on the right to a fair 
trial, the issue of the credibility and reliability of the memory that 
lies at the root of the allegations is never discussed at any length. 
Instead, the reviewing courts prefer to rely on the trial judgeÕs 
power to direct the jury on the burden and standard of proof. 
Appellate guidance is urgently needed for trial judges on (a) how 
to decide on the admissibility of expert evidence explaining the 
reasons for the delay and (b) how to direct the jury on matters of 
credibility relating to repressed and recovered memories.  
Trial judges also need guidance on how to deal with issues 
relating to the disclosure of the complainantÕs counselling and 
psychiatric records. 
 
1. Decayed Memories 
With the lengthy lapses of time involved in historic cases, 
it is not surprising that witnessesÕ memories will have decayed. 
Often witnesses will have difficulty recalling what were mundane 
facts and Òminutiae that fade from memory simply because they 
seem of no particular import at the timeÓ.119 Indeed, where the 
abuse is alleged to have occurred when the complainant was very 
young, issues around mistaken identification are very live. It is 
for this reason that discovery, post-conviction, of new evidence 
that the complainant was previously sexually abused by someone 
other than the defendant, may lead to convictions for rape and 
sexual assault being quashed, even where there is no significant 
delay in reporting.120 
_____________________________________________________ 
118 Lewis (above, n. 11), p.179. 
119 P.OÕC. v D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 87, at 93, per Hardiman J. 
120 See The People (D.P.P.) v. T.C. [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 63. The allegations of 
previous abuse only came to light during a consultation with a psychiatrist who 
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Hardiman J. has suggested that the dangers associated 
with failure of memory, even in trained professionals, should 
perhaps form the basis of a specific warning to be given in all 
historic child sexual abuse cases.121 Such a warning could be 
similar to the so-called Casey warning which is given in relation 
to visual identification.122 However, such warnings cannot be 
given in a ÒstereotypedÓ manner, but must be applied to fit the 
circumstances of the individual case.123 
 
2. Repressed Memories 
The second problem to arise in relation to memory is that 
of recovered or repressed memories. This is where the abuse is 
not remembered continuously, but is suddenly remembered many 
years after the alleged events. Recovered memories may pose 
problems for a number of reasons. The two main theories in this 
area, Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome124 and 
Betrayal Trauma Theory,125 share a core emphasis on the 
distortion of information (i.e. memories of the abuse) for the 
purposes of preserving a relationship. Research on the danger of 
suggestion in the therapeutic context and the possibility for  
Òauto suggestionsÓ as the person seeks to ÒcompleteÓ the 
                                                                                                           
was preparing the Victim Impact Report for the sentencing hearing. The Court 
of Criminal Appeal held that, had the previous sexual history evidence been 
admitted under the trial judgeÕs discretion as per the Criminal Law (Rape) Act, 
1981, s. 3, the information could have had an important effect on the course of 
the trial, on how counsel ran the case, on the cross examination, and on the 
jury. 
121 J.B. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 66, per Hardiman J. 
122 See The People v. Casey (No. 2) [1963] I.R. 33.  
123 See for example the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in D.P.P. v. 
OÕDonovan [2005] 3 I.R. 385, [2004] I.E.C.C.A. 48, where the Court quashed 
the conviction on the basis that the warning in the charge consisted inter alia 
ÒÉ wholly of a quotation from Casey. This was we fear, delivered, as a 
Ôstereotyped formulaÕ É it was not at all related, as it should have been, to the 
facts of the particular caseÓ: [2005] 3 I.R. 385, at 392, per Hardiman J., Laffoy 
and Peart JJ. concurring. 
124 Summit, ÒThe Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation SyndromeÓ (1983) 7 
Child Abuse and Neglect 177; ÒAbuse of the Child Sexual Abuse 
Accommodation SyndromeÓ (1992) 1 Journal of Child Sexual Abuse 153. 
125 On betrayal trauma theory, see Freyd, Betrayal Trauma: The Logic of 
Forgetting Childhood Abuse (Harvard University Press, 1996). 
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memory126 pose potential obstacles to the reliability of 
complainant testimony in historic cases.127 
A recent prohibition case illustrates the challenges 
presented to the courts in dealing with memories that emerge 
many years after the alleged abuse.128 The High Court considered 
the application of an 84 year old man in ill-health, who was 
charged with multiple offences of indecent assault and rape 
against his niece in the mid to late 1970s. The complaint first 
emerged as a direct response to a question from a counsellor.  
At the time, the complainant was suffering from depression 
arising from her motherÕs death, and was being treated with 
specialist medication. Her psychiatrist was of the opinion that the 
complainant may have had a number of suppressed memories 
from her youth which only resurfaced once her mother had passed 
away. Six months after making the complaint to the counsellor, 
the complainant told her relatives of the alleged abuse, by giving 
them written therapeutic notes of conversations between her 
childhood and adult personas. While the complainant continued to 
receive psychiatric treatment for Òsome timeÓ after informing her 
family of the alleged abuse, no formal complaint was made for 
several years.129 Indeed, the Court opined that the decision to 
make a formal report may have been prompted by an incident, 
witnessed by a Garda, where the accused made an offensive ÒVÓ 
sign to the complainant. While the Court found that the 
complainant ÒcrediblyÓ suppressed her memories of abuse for 
almost 30 years, the decision to prohibit was ultimately based on 
the omnibus test, looking at the cumulative effect of the delay in 
reporting, in particular the loss of crucial witnesses and the 
_____________________________________________________ 
126 Lindsay and Read, ÒPsychotherapy and Memories of Childhood Sexual 
Abuse: A Cognitive PerspectiveÓ (1994) 8 Applied Cognitive Psychology 281. 
127 Suggestibility is also relevant to understanding the ability of family 
members to distort memory. See Loftus and Ketcham, The Myth of Repressed 
Memory: False Memories and Allegations of Sexual Abuse (New York: St. 
Martins, 1994). 
128 C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400. 
129 The complainant stated that she was afraid to bring charges because her two 
aunts, sisters of the accused who lived with the accused would deny the abuse 
and support their brother. When she finally reported to the authorities, the two 
aunts had died. However there was evidence from both the accused and the 
D.P.P. that both women denied the alleged abuse. 
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applicantÕs ill-health. Hedigan J. held that the demonstrable 
prejudice to the accused could not be cured by appropriate 
warnings and directions by the trial judge. Unfortunately, 
therefore no guidance was offered as to how reviewing courts 
should approach the issue of suppressed memories, nor how trial 
judges should deal with the issue in warnings to the jury. 
From a critical feminist perspective, issues also arise in 
relation to the construction of womenÕs stories of childhood 
abuse, particularly where psychiatric diagnoses of dissociative 
disorders and borderline personality disorder are applied to 
female complainants. In these cases, the effects of abuse may be 
misinterpreted as ÒsymptomsÓ, and stigma is associated with the 
labels applied. This can mean that when abuse claims are 
reported, psychiatric diagnoses are often applied that compromise 
the credibility of the complainant.130 It is therefore important that 
trial judges are alert to the dangers of attempts by over-zealous 
defence practitioners to cast the complainant as hysterical, in 
order to destroy his or her credibility.  
 
3. Disclosure of Psychiatric Records  
The third issue relating to memory and historic child 
sexual abuse cases is that of disclosure of psychiatric and 
counselling records. The Irish courts have not considered in any 
great detail the problems associated with the disclosure of third 
party records,131 such as counselling and medical records relating 
to the complainant, by the prosecution. In other countries, such as 
England and Canada, where there is no appellate review of 
decisions to allow trials to proceed, persons convicted of historic 
sex abuse have sought to challenge the lack of proper disclosure 
_____________________________________________________ 
130 Hall and Kondora, ÒÔTrueÕ and ÔFalseÕ Child Sexual Abuse Memories and 
CaseyÕs Phenomenological View of RememberingÓ (2005) 48 American 
Behavior Scientist 1339, at 1355. 
131 An exception to this general trend is D.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 48, 
where the High Court (MacMenamin J.) criticised the late disclosure of 
psychiatric and counselling records, and noted that any attempt at trial to 
demonstrate the Òpossible interlinkage between the two complainantsÕ 
narrativeÓ would actually risk the inhibition of the defence in cross-examining 
prosecution witnesses. The late disclosure was also regrettable in light of the 
leaked media coverage of the case. See also the dissenting judgment of 
Hardiman J. in P.G. v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 19, [2007] 3 I.R. 48. 
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of records in order to impugn the fairness of the trial. It is likely 
that, in light of the reduced numbers of persons seeking 
prohibition since the decision in S.H. v. D.P.P., appeals based on 
the lack of disclosure of such records will come more common.  
Recovered memories or ÒflashbacksÓ experienced by the 
complainant during counselling at a psychiatric hospital were the 
basis for a rape allegation against Nora Wall, the first person in 
the state to receive a life sentence for rape. She was subsequently 
granted a certificate of a miscarriage of justice.132 The fact that 
these were newly recovered memories, and other factors that lead 
to the granting of the miscarriage of justice certificate, only came 
to light as a result of an interview given by the complainant to a 
newspaper following the conviction, and not as a result of 
prosecutorial disclosure. While there was no suggestion of any 
mala fides on the part of the prosecution, or that the prosecution 
was aware of the recovered nature of the memories, the case 
highlights the importance of full disclosure of all relevant third-
party psychiatric records relating to the complainant. However,  
in this context it is important to remember that the issue of 
relevance is a highly controversial one, particularly from a 
feminist perspective. The courts must be careful not to 
incorporate discriminatory myths about complainants into the 
decision on the importance or otherwise of third party records to 
the defence.133  
Challenges also arise in relation to late disclosure of 
psychiatric and medical reports relating to the complainant(s), 
_____________________________________________________ 
132 See The People (D.P.P.) v. Wall [2005] I.E.C.C.A. 140 and OÕSullivan, 
ÒThe Nun, the Rape Charge and the Miscarriage of Justice: the Case of Nora 
WallÓ (2008) 59 N.I.L.Q. 305. The Ryan Report identifies Ms. Wall as having 
beaten children in her care, and finds that she exposed children in her care to 
Òadditional riskÓ by allowing male outsiders to stay overnight at the home of 
which she was the manager. The Report gives Ms. Wall the pseudonym of  
ÒSr. CallidaÓ: Sunday Tribune, 31 May 2009. 
133 The key point is relevance Ð the courts must be careful not to incorporate 
discriminatory myths about hysterical complainants into decisions about the 
importance of third party records to the defence. See the criticism of third party 
records disclosure in Canada: Gotell, ÒTracking Decisions on Access to Sexual 
Assault ComplainantsÕ Confidential Records: The Continued Permeability of 
Subsections 278.1-278.9 of the Criminal CodeÓ (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of 
Women and Law 111.  
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particularly the vexed question of who should adduce the 
evidence of such experts at trial.134 Where there is late disclosure, 
issues relating to admissibility and relevance can quickly become 
issues for the reviewing court on an application for prohibition, 
instead of being the preserve of the trial judge as is normally the 
case. Where prohibition is not granted, but both sides have 
ventilated arguments relating to disclosure and admissibility,  
the trial judge must be prepared to formulate a charge that can 
encompass arguments relating to the late disclosure.  
  
D. Trial JudgesÕ Rulings and Direction to the Jury 
There are grave practical difficulties facing trial judges in 
warning jurors about the dangers presented by delay. Since jurors 
must try the case only on what evidence is laid before them,  
there are serious challenges for the trial judge in trying to 
formulate a suitable direction on how to incorporate the fact of 
delay into their deliberations. The attempt to warn might well 
Òdegenerate into circularityÓ,135 while the judge may warn of the 
dangers posed to the defence by the lapse of time, she might also 
warn the jury of the possibility of the delay being a result of the 
abuse, thereby rendering the warning meaningless in terms of 
helping the jury in their deliberations and reducing the risk of 
injustice. Furthermore, judges must avoid going too far and 
inviting the jury to try the case on what the evidence might have 
been, had the case been tried earlier. Guidance from the Superior 
Courts on how to address these practical difficulties would greatly 
ease the difficult burden facing trial judges in historic cases, and 
would contribute to a fairer trial process for accused persons. 
It is suggested that a standard warning should be given to 
the jury in every delayed prosecution for childhood sexual abuse. 
The warning could advise on how to accord appropriate 
weightings to the dangers and risk involved in delayed cases,  
by analysing the various dangers first separately and then 
cumulatively. Trial judges would of course be free to couch the 
warning in stricter or looser terms, depending on the individual 
_____________________________________________________ 
134 See the comments made by MacMenamin J. in J.D. v. D.P.P. [2009] 
I.E.H.C. 48. 
135 See Hardiman J.Õs comments on the difficulties in devising an appropriate 
warning: J.OÕC. v. D.P.P. [2000] 3 I.R. 478, at 523. 
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case, but some key points of guidance could be provided.  
In particular, it is suggested that the jury should be specifically 
warned of the difficulties in constructing a defence where 
memories have decayed. The jury should be made aware by the 
trial judge of the complete absence of medical or forensic 
evidence, which would normally be present if the complaint was 
made contemporaneously. 
Guidance on the meaning of the concept of dominion is 
also needed: for example it is not clear what weight should be 
attached to an alleged fear of reporting that lasted for thirty years 
after the alleged abuse. Furthermore, it is suggested that trial 
judges should caution against automatically placing a high 
probative value on memories of abuse that materialise only after 
many years. In this regard guidance on how to charge the jury in 
relation to expert evidence of recovered memories is crucial. 
Consideration might also be given to a warning against 
according too much weight to the fact of multiple complaints. 
Important questions also arise such as to how trial judges should 
advise jurors to consider the potential importance (or otherwise) 
of the missing evidence of a dead witness? Can the trial judge 
advise on such issues without infringing the role of the jury? 
Whatever its form, it is suggested that the development of some 
standard minimum warning on the issues common to most 
delayed prosecutions for childhood sexual abuse. This would be 
consistent with the mounting demands placed on accused persons 
in prohibition applications, who must show not only that they run 
the real and serious risk of an unfair trial, but that also that this 
prejudice cannot be remedied by way of rulings and directions by 




The silence surrounding child abuse has been shattered by 
a litany of reports, revelations and scandals. In the decisions on 
prohibition applications and appeals from convictions in historic 
child sexual abuse cases, the legal system is constructing the 
authenticity of suffering and criminalising those found 
responsible. The principled asymmetry at the heart of the criminal 
process requires that due process protections, including the right 
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to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence must be jealously 
protected if the system is to be faithful to the moral foundations 
of the criminal justice system.136 It is therefore absolutely 
imperative that a principled approach to the fairness of these trials 
is developed. Indeed the right to a fair trial requires the courts to 
ensure due process Òespecially É in storms of controversy or the 
hardest of casesÓ.137 
The courts have recognised that historic child sexual 
abuse cases take place in a Òlandscape disconnected from the 
normal matrix of surrounding physical and circumstantial 
detailÓ.138 Reconciling the secretive nature of these offences with 
the criminal standard of proof requires much more than a credible 
complainant. Therefore, investigating and prosecuting authorities 
must be as diligent as possible in seeking out as much collateral 
evidence supporting the complainantÕs account, and showing the 
consistency of the complainantÕs version of events if the right to a 
fair trial is to be vindicated.139 Equally, trial judges must be 
vigilant in protecting the accused person from overly harsh cross-
examination. Indeed, the Supreme Court has specifically 
criticised cross-examination that oversteps the truth-finding 
function of the exercise, and instead makes assertions as to the 
disposition of the accused to sexually abuse children.140 
_____________________________________________________ 
136 See Roberts, ÒDouble Jeopardy Law Reform: A Criminal Justice 
CommentaryÓ (2002) 65 M.L.R. 393, at 402 and Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Duckworth, 1977), p. 205. 
137 C. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 400, per Hedigan J. 
138 R. v. D.P.P. [2009] I.E.H.C. 87 (OÕNeill J.). That case involved a 30-year 
delay. ÒOlder sexual abuse cases invariably take the form of a contest between 
bare assertion and mere denial, in an empty landscape disconnected from the 
normal matrix of surrounding physical and circumstantial detail.Ó  
139 Hardiman J. has set out the practical steps to be taken by prosecuting 
authorities in investigating old allegations of sexual offences. These include a 
full record being taken by videotaping or otherwise of the allegation as 
originally made and of any altered, additional or supplemental allegation with a 
view to establishing consistency and the identification and isolation of Òislands 
of factÓ: J.B v. D.P.P. [2006] I.E.S.C. 66, per Hardiman J. 
140 The People (D.P.P.) v. D.O. [2006] I.E.S.C. 12; [2006] 3 I.R. 57. In that 
case a Òremarkable series of questionsÓ was put to the accused, culminating in 
the suggestion that he Òfitted the billÓ of the type of person Òthat [the 
complainant] contends you are a vicious sexual abuser ÉÓ. Murray C.J. also 
criticised the Òcomment in the form of a questionÓ: ÒYou donÕt seem to have 
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The prohibition case law in historic childhood sexual 
abuse prosecutions exemplifies the common lawÕs ability to adapt 
and change in accordance with the needs of society. It also 
reflects a willingness on the part of the courts to accommodate 
victimsÕ reasons for delayed reporting and the need to prosecute 
serious crime despite problems posed by lapse of time.  
By instituting a prejudice-based test the courts have located the 
core of the prohibition inquiry in the question of fairness of the 
impending trial. This is a welcome development, since the 
reasons for the delay in reporting are irrelevant to the issue of 
whether the trial should be halted. However, the numerous 
inquiries under the pre-S.H. v. D.P.P. case-law into the reasons 
for the delay has given birth to a presumption that the accused 
will not be prejudiced by the delay. This is evidenced by the 
courtsÕ approach to the issue of demonstrable prejudice and the 
lack of importance placed on the disappearance of witnesses.  
The risks of injustice associated with a trial of the credibility of 
the witnesses are compounded where the passage of time may 
have destroyed material evidence, and relevant witnesses may 
have disappeared. Furthermore, the shift from a fault-based to a 
prejudice-based test has sidelined arguments relating to the 
prejudice caused by the passage of time in itself. Arguably this 
has resulted in a lack of adequate consideration of the enormous 
task facing trial judges in trying to ensure due process in historic 
child sexual abuse cases.  
In light of the serious evidential hurdles posed to 
defendants charged with historic offences of child sexual abuse, 
                                                                                                           
many erections?Ó, and the question, ÒNow back to masturbation, when did you 
last masturbate?Ó. The demeaning nature of these questions was underscored 
by their irrelevance to the issues before the jury. The accused was also cross-
examined on his involvement with the Boy Scout movement, with counsel 
suggesting that his involvement was indicative of his Òcolossal appetite for 
engagements involving boysÓ and that this involvement was part of the 
ÒprofileÓ of a sexual deviant or pervert. Murray C.J. observed that, ÒApart from 
the fact that general evidence as to an alleged criminal disposition of an 
accused, or a profile to that effect, is inadmissible in law there was no 
evidential basis before the jury for such an inference being drawn from the 
accusedÕs involvement in the Boy Scout movement nor any as to what the 
ÔprofileÕ of such a deviant or a pervert might beÓ. Hardiman J. commented that 
he had never heard or read a cross-examination like the one in this case. 
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the difficulty facing defendants in trying to show how they have 
been prejudiced by the delay in reporting, and in light of the risk 
that an eventual trial may amount to bare assertion countered by 
bare denial, the risk of an unfair trial for persons accused of 
historic child sexual abuse is unconstitutionally high. Accordingly 
it is crucial that trial judges are provided with appropriate 
directions and warnings in order to ensure the due process rights 
of the accused are guaranteed. The case law emanating from the 
Court of Criminal Appeal in historic child sexual abuse cases 
reveals that the Court is willing to overturn convictions in 
circumstances where the judgeÕs charge did not adequately deal 
with the prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.  
However, the Court has yet to suggest a standard warning to be 
given by the trial judge that deals with the issues common to 
historic child sexual abuse cases, such as the weight to be given to 
the fact of a deceased witness or missing evidence, or the 
prejudice caused by decayed and faulty memories. Particular 
guidance would be most welcome in relation to repressed 
memories and rulings by trial judges on disclosure and 
admissibility of the complainantÕs psychiatric and counseling 
records. Guidance on rulings and directions to the jury is 
especially important given the reluctance of the courts to grant an 
order of prohibition on the grounds of delay, even where that 
delay extends over decades. It also seems particularly urgent, in 
light of comments made by Hardiman J. in April 2008: 
 
Perhaps because of the shock which civil society in 
general sustained from the revelation of incidences of 
child abuse by improbable persons and in numbers 
much greater than might have been anticipated, the fact 
is that the complainant in cases such as this attracts a 
considerable level of presumptive credence from judges 
and jurors.141 
_____________________________________________________ 
141 P.D. v. D.P.P. [2008] I.E.S.C. 22, per Hardiman J., dissenting. Indeed the 
Òpresumptive credenceÓ of the investigating authorities was a feature of  
The People (D.P.P.) v. Hannon [2009] I.E.C.C.A. 43, where a miscarriage of 
justice certificate was granted in respect of a conviction on a number of counts 
of sexual assault and of assault. The granting of the certificate only came about 
as a result of the complainantÕs complete retraction of the allegations. In that 
case, which concerned a contemporaneous complaint, the investigating Gardai 
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The provision of appellate court guidance on matters 
arising from delayed reporting is paramount if the accused 
personÕs constitutional right to a fair trial is to be vindicated. 
Anything less not only undermines due process, but also risks 
miscarriages of justice,142 and jeopardises the legitimacy of the 
entire criminal justice process.143  
 
 
Òsimply did not believeÓ that a child of ten could make up such allegations. 
Hannon is a salutary reminder of the need for rigorous and critical 
investigations in all cases of alleged sexual violence. The Court reserved the 
question of whether only a person whose innocence is recognised or 
incontrovertible is entitled to a miscarriage of justice certificate for a later date. 
It is eminently possible that such a case could arise in the context of historic 
child sexual abuse prosecution, given the potential for unfairness in these 
cases. 
142 Dworkin argues that a wrongful conviction is a deep injustice and a 
substantial moral harm. It is avoidance of this harm that underlies the universal 
insistence on respect for the right to a fair trial, and with it the presumption of 
innocence. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (above, n. 139), and 
Ashworth, ÒFour Threats to the Presumption of InnocenceÓ (2006) 10 
International Journal of Evidence and Proof 241. 
143 A function of the criminal process is to communicate its legitimacy by 
demonstrating to the community that its procedures have been fairly applied 
and that the best attempt at reaching the truth has been made. See Jackson, 
ÒManaging Uncertainty and Finality: The Function of the Criminal Trial in 
Legal InquiryÓ, in Duff, Farmer, Marshall and Tadros (eds.), The Trial on 
Trial, Volume 1: Truth and Due Process (Hart Publishing, 2004), p.125. 
